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Finding a Bridge to Somewhere: 
An Ethical Framework for Veno-
Arterial Extracorporeal Membrane 
Oxygenation Decisions
Julie Aultman and Michael S. Firstenberg
Abstract
Extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO) is an established therapy for 
the management of acute cardiopulmonary failure. A substantial concern when 
considering ECMO therapy is whether the patient will recover enough function 
to be weaned from support and survive to discharge. The concept of “a bridge to 
nowhere” is where a patient is supported on a therapy for which there is no hope for 
recovery and would, by definition, immediately die if support is discontinued—a 
somewhat unique concept in clinical medicine, but often considered when consid-
ering short-term mechanical support for acute heart and/or lung failure. Much like 
initiating mechanical ventilator support in patients who have no chance of mean-
ingful recovery, there are concerns about embarking on or continuing with ECMO 
support in patients in whom recovery is unlikely. The purpose of this chapter is to 
review the ethical foundation and principles to support the clinical decision-making 
process when there are concerns regarding the initiation, continuation, or with-
drawal of this highly invasive, resource-intensive life-support technology. Specific 
attention will be given to well-established principles of the ethical application of 
advanced life support and how to appropriately limit offering or continuing thera-
pies for which meaningful outcomes are unlikely or further support is considered 
futile.
Keywords: ethics, ECMO, ECLS, extra-corporeal membrane oxygenation, palliative 
care, morality, end-of-life, futility
1. Introduction
Veno-arterial extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (VA-ECMO) has been 
widely described as a bridge to recovery for acute reversible illnesses, transplanta-
tion, ventricular assist devices (VADs), or when the prognosis of patients with 
cardiorespiratory failure is uncertain [1–4]. Advancement of this technology has 
increased accessibility of ECMO and mobile ECMO teams, leading to several ethical 
issues of VA-ECMO. Few authors in the ethics literature delineate veno-arterial 
(VA) from veno-venous (VV) extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO) 
given the similarities among these technologies and related ethical issues (e.g., when 
to initiate or withdraw ECMO). However, for purposes of this chapter, the focus will 
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be on ethical analyses particular to VA-ECMO situations, illustrated through cases 
and ethical dilemmas we have encountered in the clinical setting.
Because of the distinct feature of VA-ECMO in providing both gas exchange 
and circulatory support through central or peripheral cannulation, it bears 
inherent potential problems, including, but not limited to, “separate perfusion 
of the lower and upper part of the body (watershed phenomenon), distention of 
the left ventricle (LV), and resulting pulmonary edema due to increased afterload 
produced by ECMO” [5]. Although close monitoring, optimizing vasopressor 
and inotropic support, the use of multiple cannulas, fluid offloading, alterna-
tive circuit configurations [e.g., veno-venous-arterial (VVA)], and adherence 
to guidelines [e.g., extra-corporal life support organization (ELSO)], can be 
beneficial for minimizing risks and maximizing peripheral and central VA-ECMO 
support, patients are nonetheless more susceptible to clinical risks, which con-
tribute to further ethical examination. Some studies (particularly in the pediatric 
literature), however, have shown no difference in complication rates between 
VA-ECMO and VV-ECMO [6].
Although, as Pavlushkov et al. [5] describe, the use of central VA-ECMO, is a 
particularly invasive approach for cardiorespiratory support that contributes to 
heightened risks of infection, injury, and bleeding as it requires chest opening 
(sometimes for days) for providing optimal perfusion flow. As the authors note, 
this type of ECMO is reserved for those patients, who will imminently die. Given 
the invasiveness and inherent levels of risk of central and peripheral VA-ECMO, it is 
critical for healthcare providers, patients, and families to engage in shared decision-
making based on a clear understanding of the treatment goals, and the values and 
interests of the patient regarding advance care planning.
Thus, an ethics coherence framework, and not simply a set of guidelines, prin-
ciples, or policies, is required for evaluating the complex ethical issues of ECMO, 
while guiding critical decisions in its initiation, management, and withdrawal of 
this technology, particularly given the potential for serious risks and unanticipated 
events. Specifically, we will be utilizing a theoretical model that builds upon the 
work of Nelson and others, known as the Wide Reflective Equilibrium (WRE), 
while appropriately integrating narrative approaches within this model that 
enhances the WRE and other ethical models for reflection and decision-making.
To begin, it is critical to identify and understand the ethics of ECMO as pre-
sented in the literature and based on real clinical scenarios. And while there is 
consistency among authors who have written about this subject matter, this is not 
to say the types of ethical issues and dilemmas presented are exhaustive; as ECMO 
technology, research, and clinical care becomes more widespread and advanced, it 
is likely we will encounter ethical issues unidentified by current experts. The WRE, 
however, will be a useful model for when new information needs to be considered 
for ethical decision-making. The flexibility and ability to accommodate new infor-
mation makes the WRE an attractive model for ethicists and healthcare profession-
als alike. Following a brief review of the literature and descriptions of the WRE, we 
will analyze two scenarios based on actual clinical cases to illustrate the value of the 
WRE for enhancing communication and decision-making among healthcare teams, 
patients, and their families.
2. A bridge to nowhere
Although ECMO is better known and valued among healthcare teams as a ben-
eficial stabilizing technology that is able to prolong artificial cardiac and respiratory 
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support external to the body, allowing patients to heal, if not fully recover, from 
traumatic injuries and diseases, it can be beneficial for giving patients and families 
more time with each other and for collective decision-making. However, decision-
making is at the heart of great ethical controversies from points of initiation to 
withdrawal of ECMO. Courtwright et al. [7] explain the most common ethical 
issues involving disagreements among and between healthcare teams, patients, 
family, and other surrogates, particularly when confronted with decisions about the 
continuation or withdrawal of ECMO.
When patients, who have started ECMO, are unable to be bridged to recovery, 
transplant, or destination device therapy, this “ethically challenging and emotion-
ally charged situation is sometimes referred to as a ‘bridge to nowhere’, with obvious 
implications for the patient, his or her family, the caregivers, the hospital, and the 
healthcare system” [1]. These ethical issues are further exacerbated by a need for 
evidence-based scientific research taking into account patients’ comorbidities and 
the use of ECMO, improved scoring systems for determinations of survivability, 
reliable and consistent brain death evaluation and neurological testing, comprehen-
sive advanced care planning prior to initiating ECMO, and improved availability, 
accessibility, and management of ECMO resources, particularly for disadvantaged 
populations. Essentially, since patients can be kept “alive” almost indefinitely 
while on VA-ECMO (particularly, given the lack of key tools for medical decision-
making—like determining brain death on ECMO), much emphasis is placed on 
determining those patients who have the greatest chance of survival, either being 
weaned or transitioned to transplant or a long-term support device. The primary 
goal of such scoring systems is not just to optimize the appropriate use of an expen-
sive and resource intensive therapy, but to help decision-makers prevent initiation 
of therapy in those patients for whom there is fundamentally, no hope of meaning-
ful survival. While such concepts can be vague and subjective, the approach is not 
all that much different than why certain therapies (i.e., major surgery) are not 
offered in patients with advanced cancers or end-stage heart disease. Basically, the 
progress is so poor, however, with ECMO, advances in therapy and experiences are 
occurring at such a rapid pace that such threshold is hard to define.
For example, Makdisi and Wang [2], citing Bartlett and Gattinoni [8] wrote “…
some helpful and score systems have been presented to assess the probability of 
survival with extracorporeal life support, using multivariate analysis of comor-
bidity, the history of lung or cardiac failure, and additional organ dysfunction, 
unfortunately there is no definitive measure of heart or lung failure to identify 80% 
mortality risk.” Without definitive measurements, these places undue burdens on 
healthcare teams when trying to communicate prognosis and treatment options, 
including when treatment is no longer beneficial to the patient’s survivability. This 
lack of certainty has further implications for non-beneficial treatment policies, the 
process of informed consent, determinations of patient capacity for decision-mak-
ing, palliative care resources, DNR orders, hospice care, and other spiritual, social, 
and emotional resources for patient and family and/or surrogate. Thus, the ethical 
issues are more complex than “simply” disagreements about continuing or stopping 
ECMO; there are several decisions to be made, and, in most cases, patients, family, 
and surrogates are not well-prepared for such decision-making due to several fac-
tors, including, but not limited to, poor advance care planning, miscommunication, 
and unexpected confounding issues (e.g., cardiac arrest, sepsis, etc.).
One of the greatest difficulties that families experience when faced with a loved 
one, who is doing poorly on ECMO, is helping healthcare providers understand 
what the limits of what care patient would want—how much they want to live. 
Providers try to remain objective and unbiased, but often their own experiences 
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and insights help pave a direction. For example, in the context of facing truly 
imminent death of a loved one, and often someone, who was previously perceived 
to be relatively young and healthy (which is why ECMO might have been offered 
in the first place), familiar members must very quickly prepare and come to terms 
with the reality that their loved one might not even survive. If a patient is on ECMO, 
especially if they are experiencing complications (which are quite common), then 
conversations about leg and digit amputations and major disfiguring surgery often 
occur. Even discussions about temporary therapies as further bridges to what can 
be perceived as a long and difficult recovery are unclear and difficult, such as the 
need for dialysis, feeding tubes, tracheostomies, prolonged stays for recovery in 
long-term care facilities, or nursing homes. Without a doubt, such conversations, 
time-sensitive and emotionally charged, and often financially difficult, topics can 
be very difficult to process and reconcile.
And, while the ethical issues would be less complex when patients are alert, and 
able to make their own decisions, there are instances where the “bridge to nowhere,” 
as Abrams et al. [1] describe, leave the patient in a type of limbo: without ECMO, 
they will not be able to interact with family and others with some quality of life 
at the end of life, yet ECMO is no longer beneficial for the patient’s transition to 
transplantation, VADs, or recovery and survivability. The question, then, is when 
should ECMO be withdrawn?
For Abrams et al. [1], it would be cruel and unethical to withdraw ECMO 
without the consent of the patient. But what if the patient will not consent to its 
withdrawal? What are the implications of using ECMO when it has no direct clini-
cal benefits, but acutely sustains the quality of one’s life, as measured by human 
interactions and relationships, and the ability to buy more time to make end of 
life plans? While we agree with Abrams et al. [1], it would be cruel and unethical 
to simply withdraw ECMO in such cases where patients are alert, we also argue 
that the prolonged use of clinically non-beneficial ECMO does not always provide 
a quality of life or effectively aid the patient to make end of life preparations. 
When the patient is awake on non-beneficial ECMO, the reality is they are termi-
nally ill, requiring pain management, and not necessarily in a position to make 
critical decisions. Furthermore, the patient’s quality of life may be misunderstood 
by family/surrogates and healthcare professionals at the bedside; their percep-
tions are contrary to the actual experiences and values of the patient. Thus, it is 
imperative that hospitals and ECMO facilities utilize comprehensive resources for 
providing:
1. grief counseling for patients and families;
2. access to end of life preparations (e.g., funeral homes, burial sites, family legal 
representatives, etc.);
3. ongoing and direct communication about the prolonged physical, cognitive, 
and emotional effects of ECMO on the patient (and family/surrogate), finan-
cial costs, and the scarcity of ECMO technologies, and;
4. palliative and spiritual care, to ease social, physical, and emotional pain and 
suffering and to accommodate the cultural, religious, and spiritual needs of 
the patient.
However, this assumes that such resources are available and accessible. By 
having such resources, not only the burdens of prolonged non-beneficial ECMO 
(including financial costs, inability to serve other patients in need, etc.) are 
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reduced, but healthcare teams can prepare patients and families/surrogates to 
withdraw support and accept death without fear or resistance. While it is difficult 
to determine the scope of this problem, what is clear is that as ECMO is being 
used more frequently—especially in extreme cases—there is a growing number 
of patients, who are awake and alert, but are being kept immediately alive by life 
support for which discontinuation would result in immediate death. Even patients 
who take themselves off of other forms of organ replacement therapies—such as 
dialysis and ventilators—can live for days (if not longer, depending on the circum-
stances) before slowly, and often painlessly, succumbing to the consequences of the 
lack of organ function. The facing of immediate death is what separates removing 
ECMO from removing other therapies such as dialysis or even medical therapies, 
like chemotherapy. While the literature is sparse in this area, many providers who 
are involved in the care of patients requiring long-term life support with mechani-
cal cardiac support devices (i.e., ventricular assist devices) are intimately aware of 
cases in which patients clearly took themselves off of support, essentially commit-
ted suicide, by removing or not replacing the power sources that such devices are 
dependent upon.
2.1 When surrogates disagree with the healthcare team
Ramanathan et al. [9] wrote, “Potential conflicts occur when the next of kin or 
the patient’s proxies and physician do not agree on treatment options, when options 
are scarce or unavailable, and when the options themselves are unclear because of 
uncertainties about the effectiveness or the duration of treatment” [9, 10]. While 
such events are common in medicine, in the context of ECMO, while therapy can 
continue for a long-term, often in the absence of clearly defined decision-making, 
often the decisions will be made by themselves—frankly, patients often will develop 
life-threatening (or ending) complications that will define an outcome regardless of 
objective decision-making. Massive bleeding, neurologic catastrophes, overwhelm-
ing sepsis, and infections are common in the context of ECMO and often lead to the 
obvious discussions of the fact that “nothing else can be done.”
Howe [11], in considering what clinicians should do if patients and/or loved 
ones never agree to stop treatment, wrote, “hospital authorities would stop ECMO 
if patients, loved ones, and clinicians won’t” and confirms our own experiences 
that “[P]ediatricians have told me than when children have ECMO, clinicians may 
have more discretion” [11]. Hospital authorities may be justified to intervene for 
purposes of fair resource allocation; ECMO is unavailable to patients in need due 
to continued use among patients, who are no longer benefiting from this limited 
resource. However, decision-making should not simply be about fair resource 
allocation. While children are often considered much more resilient than adults, the 
survival rates on ECMO are not that much different between adults and children, 
and there must be early discussions with families regarding this reality to help 
better manage expectations. Similar models of care and discussions are often held 
in the context of young children, who otherwise appear to be very much “alive,” but 
who are, in fact, irreversibly neurologically devastated or even brain dead.
Makdisi and Makdisi [4] explain “It is important not to force the family into 
making decisions that are against their beliefs and to provide them with adequate 
psychological support through and after the process, it is also important to under-
stand their emotional needs, and understand the program from their perspective” 
[1, 12]. However, Abrams et al. [1] argue, “a strong case can be made to discontinue 
the intervention, with appropriate concessions of timing to the surrogates. There is 
no issue of emotional or physical patient suffering in that case and it is even pos-
sible, if not probably that the patient would not want his or her life prolonged in 
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such circumstances” [1]. So, while the healthcare team should not force decisions 
without support, there are limits to the extent ECMO should be used for patients, 
who are no longer benefitting clinically, socially, or otherwise, and are kept alive for 
the sake of the surrogate(s) own interests. Ongoing communication and a robust 
informed consent process with detailed information (e.g., harmful outcomes of 
prolonged ECMO use) can contribute to improved family or surrogate understand-
ing and decision-making that is in the best interests of the patient. Unfortunately, 
such a comprehensive approach is not always beneficial. Shah et al. [12] suggest:
“Conversely, some may offer ‘comprehensive’ explanations inundated with technical 
points and statistical data incomprehensible to family members. Often, medical 
care in such acute situations may shift to a less desirable ‘paternalistic model’ in 
which the clinician is directing care rather than partnering with the patient or 
family acting on his behalf. These ethical dilemmas stem from the uncertainty of 
the outcome as well as lack of clarity on the intended treatment direction, whether 
bridge or lifetime support” [12].
Meltzer and colleagues [13] describe a 40-year-old Hasidic Orthodox Jewish 
mother of four children, diagnosed with large B-cell lymphoma, which contributes 
to acute heart failure and the need for ECMO treatment. Prior to treatment, discus-
sions surrounding the potential need to withdraw ECMO were discussed early on 
with the patient, her family, and their rabbi. The family agreed to stop ECMO when 
the need arises; however, when it became clear, ECMO was no longer providing 
beneficial treatment, the family refused to stop the treatment. In reflecting on this 
case, Howe [11] explains:
We do not know why the family changed their minds. Perhaps even they didn’t 
know, but primarily responded to their fear the patient would die. That the family 
changed how they felt illustrates how unsure shared decision-making can be. The 
family’s experiences convey the pain all those involved in deciding to stop ECMO 
may feel, whether clinicians decide on their own or share the decision-making [11].
This and other similar situations reveal not only simple changes in a patient’s 
story or a change of mind among family and surrogates, but also how the narra-
tive continues and develops over time with decisions and courses of action that are 
informed by new experiences, moral thinking, clinical information, emerging feel-
ings of hope, and so forth. Religious, racial, cultural, emotional, and ethnic themes 
are common in such conflicts and must be recognized very early in the discussions. 
In addition, every healthcare provider who needs to be involved with such critical 
family (and patient) conversations must acknowledge, and prepare, for the reality 
that thoughts about continuing life-sustaining therapies is very much different 
when one is dealing with the abstract (i.e., your mother might not survive therapy 
and we might need to stop support) versus the impending and immediate reality 
(i.e., your mother is not going to survive therapy and we must consider stopping 
support right now).
Furthermore, from the example illustrated by Howe [11], it is important to 
understand that the patient and her family are situated in different points of time 
with a new set of ethical considerations. A patient and family could be well-
informed and prepared for future decision-making, however, that information 
does not necessarily carry any meaning until a critical decision is required. The 
life story of the patient merely continues and is not “re-written” and the family or 
surrogate is not simply “changing their minds,” but are acquiring new information, 
i.e., the impending death of their loved one, which transforms their thoughts, 
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emotions, and behaviors such that decisions to forgo or withdraw treatment can be 
difficult and any future hope for survival is lost. Early discussions, hypothetical 
scenarios, and some shared decision-making (e.g., DNR orders) might prepare 
some patients and families, but even with such preparations they are not—at that 
time—required to make life-altering decisions or give up hope. Certainly, it may 
be the case that shared decision-making might be “unsure” because the healthcare 
team and family did maintain ongoing communication or a mutual understanding 
of each other’s values, thoughts, and overall interests.
However, even with the best communication, the moment treatment is no longer 
beneficial, it is the moment that family or surrogate decision-makers are receiving 
new information and expected to “do what is best or right” for the patient, despite 
their own emotional suffering and loss of hope. So, instead of thinking families 
and surrogates “change their minds,” which can elicit feelings of frustration among 
healthcare providers, understanding they are simply confronted with new informa-
tion and need further guidance and support in decision-making (e.g., discussions 
about quality life now versus then) can alleviate frustration and lead to better out-
comes. Caring for the family [8] and recognizing the difficulty of their predicament 
can effectively lead to a mutually supported ethical decision to withdraw ECMO 
and provide comfort care measures, allowing for a peaceful death of a loved one.
2.2 Disagreements among healthcare professionals and institutions
Besides the ethical difficulties of decision-making among surrogates, healthcare 
professionals may also encounter ethical dilemmas, when there are disagreements 
among team members or at the institutional level (e.g., policy disagreements). 
While many ethics cases focus on disagreements between the healthcare team and 
patients and/or family members, where miscommunication, misunderstanding, 
and conflicting values and interests contribute to these disagreements, similar prob-
lems can arise among healthcare professionals and institutions, particularly when 
new technologies or new uses for technologies emerge with unanticipated ethical 
issues and problems, and a lack of standards, policies, or laws to provide guidance 
toward resolution. Such disagreements might be motivated by or directly lead to 
burnout, moral distress, lack of healthcare professional autonomy, and disregard 
of team-based practices. Disagreements among the healthcare team involving the 
initiation or withdrawal of ECMO might also be related to a general lack of institu-
tional guidance (procedures, processes, and policies), conflicts of diagnostic and 
prognostic opinions, and misinterpretations of patients’ cultural and moral values 
and interests. Ongoing communication, respect for healthcare team members, and 
collaborative contributions to the improvement of guidance measures (e.g., policy 
development), are essential for minimizing disagreements and those negative 
consequences that follow.
2.3 Extracorporeal CPR and DNR
Another ethical issue presented by Abrams et al. [1] involves VA-ECMO for 
extracorporeal CPR (ECPR), which is a more evasive and resource intensive inter-
vention than traditional CPR that has the ability to cause undue suffering and harm 
to an already medically compromised patient. And ECMO, especially VA ECMO, 
“places the DNR order under severe conceptual strain both to the family and the 
physician” [9].
The prognosis for ECPR is uncertain during a cardiac arrest even when factors, 
such as the patient’s condition, available resources, expertise, and past patient 
experience of the healthcare team are known. Because the concept and application 
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of E-CPR (the focus of other areas of this book) are so rapidly evolving with large 
spectrums of potential outcomes based upon many complex circumstances, it is dif-
ficult to establish a timely and appropriate reference for objectively engaging in dis-
cussions about outcomes and prognosis. Abrams et al. [1] wrote “If the use of ECPR 
becomes even more widespread, there is a real concern that it would be an expected 
intervention for patients suffering acute cardiac arrest. If this occurs, physicians 
would need to incorporate ECPR into advance directive discussions, potentially 
requiring the development of a DNR with ECMO order.” Regardless of infrequent or 
limited occurrences of ECPR, it is the opinion of these authors to incorporate ECPR 
into advance directive discussions whenever the situation arises, including educa-
tion, training, and policies that require ECPR to be a part of DNR orders or Medical 
Order of Life Saving Treatment (MOLST) orders. It is perplexing why healthcare 
teams would not be doing this advance care planning already when such planning 
can be reasonably done. Nevertheless, the rapid growth of the utilization of ECPR 
must prompt such conversations—especially, since it is a therapy that is currently 
not available widely, yet.
2.4 Organ preserving ECMO
Another set of ethical issues arise for those healthcare teams, who are using 
ECMO to preserve organs. Organ preserving extracorporeal membrane oxygenation 
(OP-ECMO) may be used for patients, who are already on ECMO and who become 
brain dead. In such cases, vital organs can be preserved for transplantation, which 
have obvious benefits to others who are in need of organs for survival. Dalle Ave and 
authors wrote, “Organ-preserving extracorporeal membrane oxygenation can benefit 
society by fulfilling the wishes of those who wish to donate, by making more organs 
available for transplantation and by saving the lives of patients in need of organs.” 
[14]. From a utilitarian perspective, saving several people with the viable organs of an 
individual, who no longer has quality of life and has irreversible loss of brain func-
tion, is a valid ethical justification.
Dalle Ave et al. [14] suggest that OP-ECMO is analogous to the continuation 
of mechanical ventilator for purposes of procurement. However, as these authors 
have also pointed out, there are challenges, similar to patients supported by ventila-
tor, in determining brain death. Such determinations may be even more difficult 
given that the oxygenation process of ECMO can compromise neurological testing. 
Nonetheless, despite its uncertainty, a declaration of brain death holds great ethical 
(and legal) value in ensuring that organs are not being procured from patients who 
categorically are still living. However, this leads to deeper philosophical discus-
sions as to what counts as “living” and whether brain death criteria should be 
used for purposes of organ procurement from patients, let alone ECMO patients. 
Furthermore, there is evidence in the past decade or so that patients, who were 
initially declared brain dead based on neurological standards, narrowly “escaped” 
organ harvesting by waking up prior to or during operating room preparations 
[15–19] or had reversible “brain death” determinations [15, 19, 20]. Although these 
“narrow escape” cases are few, they should give healthcare professionals pause in 
relying on existing brain death criteria and neurological testing. Furthermore, Dalle 
Ave et al. [14] have explained that ECMO can increase the potential risks of intra-
cranial bleeding, causing undue suffering among individuals, who may have some 
undetected brain activity and can hasten death [14].
Given the uncertainty of determining brain death among ECMO patients, the 
risks of the aforementioned issues may not adequately outweigh the potential 
benefits of having viable organs for procurement (and this is assuming the organs 
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will, in fact, be viable upon procurement). With further scientific data to validate 
clinical tests used with any brain-injured patient, as well as those specifically on 
ECMO for both acute and prolonged periods of time, as well as more consistency 
among medical professionals in determining brain death, the threshold of uncer-
tainty may be reduced, thus minimizing, if not eliminating, potential direct harms 
to patients, and subsequent emotional, social, and financial harms to their families 
and potential organ recipients. Nguyen [15] also adds that there have been logical 
and scientific inconsistencies when reasoning brain death at the bedside, as well 
as a general lack of understanding of the pathophysiology of the brain, where an 
absence of evidence of brain functions is not necessarily the equivalent to irrevers-
ible loss or death of the brain.
Furthermore, in his brief ethical assessment of care for the patient with (pos-
sible) brain death, Nguyen [15] emphasizes the importance of the physician’s 
moral attitudes and subsequent actions to reflect caring for the patient, motivated 
by the inherent value of the patient as person, and not by a set of ethical rules or 
principles. However, Nguyen, a Catholic physician, who is guided by non-secular 
ethics, also argues that brain death cannot be equated with the biological death of 
the person; harvesting organs from brain death donors, thus, “brings about their 
true and premature death.” His attentiveness to the inconsistencies and inadequa-
cies of brain death determination are valuable, as is his personal moral perspective, 
which aligns with the teachings of Catholicism. However, for those patients for 
whom we can identify as brain dead (or in the future with improved research, 
testing, and technologies), the definition and meaning of death should be left up 
to the healthcare team and surviving family; hence, the need to have advance care 
planning and conversations much earlier, if possible, prior to the urgency of patient 
care, and often, subsequent paternalistic decision-making. Further challenging this 
concept is the very concept that “brain death” is “death” and that any continuation 
of medical care is medically, ethically, and legally inappropriate. Even patients who 
have been appropriately declared “brain death” are often kept on support for pro-
longed periods of time for family members to completely understand the scope of 
the circumstances, and even waiting for a family member to come from out of town 
in a few days to “buy time” is not appropriate. Such events are not uncommon and 
are very dependent on experienced healthcare providers appropriately managing 
expectations and having open, honest, and transparent conversations with families 
from the onset of therapy.
3. Toward an integrated approach: the wide reflective equilibrium
Bein et al. [21] wrote, “At the end of the day, we are left alone with our own 
‘common moral.’ However, there should be a method of finding a solution for the 
individual patient and for his dignity in a sensible and faithful way if we under-
stand that the medical perspective is not the only one that needs to come to a deci-
sion.” Howe [11] in reflecting on Meltzer and colleagues [22], places importance on 
shared decision-making among healthcare professionals, patients, and their loved 
ones when the withdrawal of ECMO results in the patient’s death despite the fact 
some clinicians believe such decisions are theirs alone. Reasons why clinicians may 
want to make the decision to stop ECMO include “from wanting to spare patients 
and families the exceptional pain of making the decision to reasons that are less 
altruistic” such as alleviating suspected guilt among family and alleviating the 
burdens of decision-making, assuming family may simply want the physician to 
decide [11].
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Nevertheless, the concept of shared decision-making, making sure that patients 
and families have an increased sense of ownership and responsibility to make their 
own medical decisions that will ultimately impact both the quality and quantity of 
life, is becoming more common. This is especially true in area of medicine in which 
it is unclear of what the “best” or most appropriate decision should be and the 
responsibility is then placed in the hands of the patient. Nevertheless, as discussed 
above, some patients and families become completely paralyzed by the inability to 
sometimes even make basic medical decisions and will often defer to the concept of 
“do everything” or “do whatever you think it best.”
Such authors suggest an integrated approach, however, they do not provide 
one that might appropriately guide ethical decision-making, while taking into 
account the complex values of the healthcare team, patient, and family, as well as, 
the healthcare organization or system. Thus, we propose using the Wide Reflective 
Equilibrium (WRE), a theoretical model that builds upon contemporary philosoph-
ical theories and considerations, including narrative ethics. In the discussion of two 
case studies (based on features of existing clinical cases), we apply this model and 
illustrate its benefits in guiding pragmatic and ethical decisions prior to and during 
the use of VA-ECMO technology for patient care.
3.1 The wide reflective equilibrium (WRE)
The WRE is a theoretical model developed by Nielsen [23, 24] by extending the 
work of Norman Daniels and political philosopher Rawls [25]. This method consists 
of working back and forth among our judgments about particular situations, beliefs 
about those principles or rules that guide them, and additional considerations and 
beliefs relevant to the situation. The aim to find coherence by testing our beliefs 
against other systems of belief, moral theories, and non-moral views, revising and 
refining them, in a process of moral deliberation. The WRE as a model for practical 
ethics can be a way to recognize the value of multiple, methodologies in ethics (e.g., 
principlism, casuistry, and narrative) such that specific cases, theories, principles, 
and context (of stories or situations) matter and can contribute to the interplay of 
the WRE framework.
By using the WRE with an ethical situation, we work back and forth between 
three elements, including our initial moral judgment, background beliefs, and 
theories (e.g., social theory, clinical information, and legal laws), and ethical 
theories and principles to achieve coherence. WRE is then continually rewoven in 
light of new knowledge or circumstances, which may alter any or all elements of the 
WRE. Beauchamp and Childress [26] explain that “No matter how wide the pool of 
beliefs, we have no reason to anticipate that the process of pruning, adjusting, and 
rendering coherent will either come to an end or be perfected” ([27], p. 66). Joan 
McCarthy writes, “On this understanding, the processes of moral deliberation are 
akin to scientific processes: they involve the setting up of hypotheses that are tested 
and modified or rejected on the basis of reasoning and experience. In turn, the aim 
of unifying one’s moral beliefs and background commitments is analogous to the 
scientific goal of achieving theoretical consistency and unity” [27].
While McCarthy shows the value of the WRE that incorporates principles into 
ethical decision-making, she also identifies the benefits of a narrative ethic, which 
draws upon “narrative concepts and methodologies drawn from literary criticism 
and philosophy as tools of moral understanding and assessment,” [27] and is 
formulated through various approaches such that individual stories are closely read, 
or compared to, even woven within, other stories, giving context to existing moral 
theories and models, serving as a theory in and of itself, or promoting the emer-
gence of new ethical thought. McCarthy suggests that one can test various personal 
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narratives against various criteria similar to the way moral rules or principles are 
tested through the process of reflective equilibrium, and, thus, proposes a Narrative 
Reflective Equilibrium (NRE) to challenge and modify first person narratives. This 
narrative approach can be particularly useful for end of life decision-making, espe-
cially when healthcare professionals, surrogates, and others try to make sense of an 
incompetent patient’s life story, which can reveal multiple courses of actions that 
are compatible with and would be “meaningful and consistent with the patient’s 
self-conception” if she were the one deciding [27].
McCarthy shows that both principlism and narrative ethics provide important, 
often overlapping, ethical skills that can reinforce each other through delibera-
tive, reflective processes that aim to achieve coherence and shared understanding 
[27]. Yet, the NRE is unnecessary unless we give primacy to a narrative approach 
over other ethical approaches under consideration. That is, the WRE is able to be 
a valuable model that incorporates principlism, narrative ethics, among other meth-
odologies without be reductive to one approach or another; thus, it is unnecessary 
to have such a coherence model distinct from WRE. The other elements of WRE, 
including initial moral judgments and background beliefs and theories, including 
clinical and scientific facts, legal laws and policies, religious and spiritual beliefs 
and perceptions, and so forth are significant for not only further understanding 
the context of patients’, caregivers’, and others’ stories, but also may contribute to 
new information that have the power to create new stories, reveal multiple courses 
of action based on different interpretations of stories, including alternative ethical 
considerations. Such new information might even be an unconsidered personal 
narrative that requires coherence among not just other narratives, but also among 
the other elements of WRE. It is this WRE that embraces narrative, as well as other 
ethical theories and approaches (which are themselves often embedded in nar-
ratives), which may untangle some complex ethical issues, arriving at justifiable 
courses of action through ongoing revision and refinement. Because, we cannot 
ignore the clinical, social, legal, economical, and ethical elements of VA-ECMO, a 
framework that recognizes these elements, as well as, patient and caregiver stories, 
relationships, and values, will best guide shared decision-making and perhaps find 
a “bridge to somewhere.”
4. Finding a bridge to somewhere
To illustrate how the WRE can be a beneficial model for shared decision-making, 
we present two cases, followed by our ethical analysis.
4.1 Case 1
A critically ill 67-year-old female patient, M.J. presents to the cardiology team 
with progressive heart disease, profound cardiogenic shock, as a result of a massive 
acute myocardial infarction secondary to long-standing known coronary artery 
disease in the setting of previous coronary artery bypass surgery (CABG). As a 
result of a recently diagnosed, but medically treated breast cancer, she is neither a 
candidate for a transplant nor is a long-term ventricular assist device a reasonable 
option. Due to her ability to breathe on her own without ventilator support, she is 
on VA-ECMO without having to be in a clinically induced coma. Thus, she is alert, 
at times able to interact with family, but unfortunately has a poor prognosis and 
would die without ongoing ECMO support. The support is non-beneficial in that it 
will not be an effective bridge to survival, but simply a means to temporarily sustain 
a terminal life. M.J. is scared of dying, and feels as though if she gives up now, she 
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will be a disappointment to her loved ones. Because of the patient’s insistence to 
keep living as long as possible, the healthcare team, family, and those closest to the 
patient are uncomfortable with removing ECHO. The healthcare team sees current 
benefit in giving the patient time to make end of life plans and spend time with 
family despite the financial burdens of ECMO. The issue of this case, however, is 
that M.J. refuses to listen to the healthcare team about her impending prognosis and 
to consider end of life planning in the event she is no longer able to make decisions.
Although the case of M.J. involves the use of VA-ECMO for a “bridge to 
nowhere,” the healthcare team would like to see this not as a futile endeavor but 
one that bridge to a peaceful closure to life. For the multitude of patients who do 
not get to choose their deaths, M.J. has an opportunity to make end of life plans 
based on her values and needs, and yet the healthcare team is struggling as to why 
she is not engaged in such planning. When looking at this case through the lens of 
WRE, the initial moral judgment of the healthcare team may look like “M.J. should 
remain on ECMO.” And, as simply put, there is consensus that removing ECMO 
from M.J. at this point in time would be unethical given that it is providing benefit 
by caring for her end of life needs, e.g., seeing family; removing ECMO could lead 
to moral distress among healthcare professions, emotional and social harm to M.J 
and her family, potential legal liability, and social distrust. Looking at the benefits 
versus the risks of financial burden for family, lack of ECMO access for other 
patients, and amount of teamwork required to sustain M.J.’s life (i.e., “manpower” 
hours), as well as institutional considerations that may require alternative actions, 
e.g., transfer of care, before enacting non-beneficial treatment policies for the 
withdrawal of ECMO.
4.1.1 Initial moral judgment
In the event M.J. becomes incapacitated, we may ask the question, “For how long 
should M.J. remain on ECMO?” This new scenario and question prompts new moral 
judgments and ethical, clinical, legal, and social considerations such that “M.J. 
should not remain on ECMO due to progression of disease and unavoidable harm.” 
This judgment, loaded with clinical and social requirements, leads to concerns 
about surrogate decision-making and refusal of withdrawal, DNR and ECPR, and 
OP-ECMO. If M.J.’s family supports her decision for continuing life support even 
when she no longer has capacity, this will lead to a complex dilemma for the health-
care team and family. The initial moral judgment, then, for the healthcare team will 
be based on their ability to sustain a quality of life for M.J.
4.1.2 Background beliefs and theories
Before delving into the ethical theories and principles, an analysis of multiple 
factors, i.e., background beliefs, including existing policies, laws, family beliefs and 
social theory, clinical information, etc., is essential to work back and forth among 
the WRE elements. Healthcare professionals are not required to provide futile treat-
ment, and thus, many institutions have non-beneficial treatment or futility policies. 
Of course, the notion of futility is highly debated and this case, in point, shows how 
the concept of what is or is not beneficial may depend on the context of the situa-
tion (i.e., alert patient, family at the bedside). These conceptual considerations are 
valuable when working through the WRE, as well as the pragmatic considerations 
such that medical evidence, laws, and policies are considered. If M.J.’s surrogate 
or next of kin refuses to withdraw ECMO, the healthcare team may enact a non-
beneficial treatment policy with the option to transfer care to another facility that 
may accept M.J.
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Here is where the WRE pushes the healthcare team, ethics committee, or general 
counsel to find out if transfer of care is even possible, i.e., willingness, accessibil-
ity, and availability of other institutions. That is, M.J. may not be mobile, facilities 
may be at full capacity, they may not take cases like M.J.’s, or they may not have 
the team to support ECMO. If transfer of care is not possible, legal action is most 
likely the next course of action. To further complicate the matter, decisions of 
DNR and whether ECPR should be initiated must also be considered. While ECPR 
may sustain life, even for a short time, M.J. is still terminal and such interventions 
will not lead to clinically beneficial results. DNR discussions are essential prior to 
patients becoming incapacitated; however, given that option is no longer viable, 
such discussions need to occur with M.J.’s surrogate decision-maker. These policies, 
standards, and theoretical concepts (e.g., futility), should be considered in light of 
ethical theories and principles under the WRE model.
4.1.3 Ethical theories and principles
In light of clinical facts, existing policies, and standards, the healthcare team feels 
that it is best to withdraw support based on ethical considerations. By keeping M.J. 
“alive” on ECMO (and equally its removal) can violate the ethical principle of non-
maleficence (“do no harm”), as would initiating CPR. Quality of life was understood 
as M.J.’s ability to interact with her family although she understood that ECMO was a 
non-beneficial treatment. However, due to her current state, and progressive declin-
ing health, she no longer has quality of life, and may potentially suffer if she still has 
brain function with continued ECMO use. Thus, the healthcare team believes it is their 
ethical obligation to withdraw all support so as to do no harm, despite allowing death 
to occur, which, to some, is counter to the goals of medical care. In addition, there are 
justice issues with this scenario; it is unjust utilizing a needed public resource for a 
patient who is no longer benefitting from that resource, especially when availability 
and accessibility is limited. Furthermore, the family is accruing a potential financial 
burden, and may not be fully cognizant of the economic costs of keeping a person alive 
because they are not wanting to let her go or violate her autonomous wish to be kept 
alive. The economic burdens, in their mind, may not outweigh their unrelenting desire 
to keep her alive and abide by her wishes. Besides principle-based considerations, the 
narrative approach is also valuable in this scenario to better understand the family’s 
interests and values, and whether they are genuinely aware of M.J.s current state.
Furthermore, M.J.’s story may further reveal to the family/surrogate decision-
maker and healthcare team that her autonomous wish to be kept alive was only 
intended to be limited for when she was alert and able to interact with her sur-
roundings. If she and her family’s insistence on “doing everything possible” with 
continued ECMO support and refusal of DNR orders (a concept that, in itself, 
is somewhat misleading since the patient is, by definition, full cardiopulmonary 
life-support. As such, the term DNR is the setting of ECMO is often used to place 
objective limitations on escalation of support—such as initiating or escalating doses 
of vasoactive medications, new antibiotics, or performing additional invasive pro-
cedures) is motivated by cultural, religious, spiritual, or philosophical beliefs, these 
beliefs would then be brought into the WRE framework and pushing us to move 
back and forth between these beliefs and ethical theories and principles. Narrative 
ethics pushes us deeper into the reasoning behind our patients’ and surrogates’ 
decisions and beliefs and contextualizing the aforementioned considerations for 
further reflection and refinement. With deeper understanding, the healthcare 
team may have to utilize more resources, and justify the use of those resources, e.g., 
chaplaincy service, while possibly postponing critical decisions and the alleviation 
of M.J.’s harm and suffering.
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4.1.4 Revision, refinement, and reflection
There may be some compromises (not necessarily consensus) among patients, 
family, and the healthcare team as we move back and forth among these elements 
of the WRE. For example, the healthcare team may be able to educate the family or 
surrogate about M.J.’s poor prognosis and the possible suffering she might endure 
if prolonged on ECMO as supported by their ethical obligation to do no harm. The 
family or surrogate, possibly feeling guilt, fear, or any number emotions in confront-
ing the death of a loved one, might not want to sacrifice M.J.’s welfare for a previously 
declared request for continued treatment, and decide to withdraw. Then again, they 
may compromise and ask to have some more time with MJ, but with the acceptance of 
a DNR order. They may also be motivated to withdraw or accept a DNR order by rec-
ognizing that patients with quality lives can survive if they have access to the ECMO 
technology that is currently being utilized by M.J. The context of the decisions by 
which the healthcare will support or reject the family’s decision just may depend on 
the level of harm, whether there is a patient in need of the ECMO unit, or if a transfer 
of care is possible. Regardless, the WRE should not simply be a tool for just healthcare 
professionals to come to terms with their initial moral judgments; the WRE should 
involve the perspectives, stories, and values of all persons who have stake in the deci-
sions to be made. That is, the WRE can be a useful tool for shared decision-making, 
where considerations are presented by multiple persons and parties.
Moreover, in any of the possible outcomes, the WRE shows us that there does 
not have to be a single decision, recommendation, or outcome; some outcomes may 
be ethically preferable than others, however, the best outcome is one that has been 
carefully vetted through the WRE framework. With new information, the decisions 
may change, the patient, family and/or surrogates may be understood more fully as 
stakeholders in a shared decision-making process, and the healthcare team will have 
recognized that medical decisions, policies, and even laws may be subjected to revi-
sion and refinement. More importantly, once more permanent decisions are made 
such that ECMO is withdrawn, it is important for such decisions to be reflected on, 
asking “what other considerations might we have failed to consider?”
4.2 Case 2
A 22-year-old, previously healthy, male patient presents with severe cardiac failure 
due to fulminant myocarditis associated with a viral infection. The patient, T.K. has 
been experiencing flu-like symptoms for over 3 weeks without seeking appropriate 
medical attention. After passing out at a fast food restaurant, paramedics arrived on the 
scene and suspected cardiogenic shock, which was confirmed by his healthcare team. 
Clinical tests further confirm tachycardia, hypotension, left ventricle dysfunction, 
severe respiratory failure, and rapidly evolving multi-organ failure. Furthermore, T.K. 
did not respond to mechanical ventilation. Currently, T.K. is on ECMO as a potential 
bridge to VAD, however, due to a significant embolic stroke sustained while on ECMO, 
it is unlikely that he will survive with meaningful quality of life. T.K. has already been 
resuscitated, and the healthcare team is questioning whether to continue ECMO treat-
ment toward VAD, continue ECMO for a short time (“bridge to nowhere”), withdraw 
ECMO, or consider OP-ECMO. T.K. currently does not have decision-making capacity; 
his estranged father is at his bedside and trying to make sense of the situation.
4.2.1 Initial moral judgment
While there are several possible courses of actions, the healthcare team could 
take their initial moral judgment that is to avoid as much harm to the patient as 
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possible, while establishing a more accurate prognosis regarding T.K.’s quality of 
life. The team also believes that including T.K.’s father in ongoing discussions about 
his son’s prognosis is ethically appropriate.
4.2.2 Background beliefs and theories
When considering the risks and benefits of the options presented by the 
healthcare team that are specific to T.K. and his current status, it is clear that 
without ECMO support, there is no hope of recovery. In regard to their “hope for 
recovery,” the healthcare team reviews all of the clinical facts surrounding T.K.’s 
situation. For example, it is not uncommon for patients on ECMO to have neu-
rological complications such as ischemic stroke, however, outcomes are limited 
to few reported cases [6]. The amount of neurological damage due to embolic 
stroke and quality of life is uncertain until the patient is able to move from critical 
care to a period of recovery, where further neurological assessment can be done 
along with rehabilitative interventions. Although, it is initially suspected that 
T.K. will have a poor quality of life if he survives, uncertainty gives the healthcare 
team pause. They have seen some patients recover, and others who had to be 
withdrawn from ECMO with no survivability. T.K.’s young age and prior health 
status contribute to the team’s push to continue ECMO, while being mindful of 
the inherent and ongoing risks of continued treatment. The team can continue to 
try to manage the emerging multi-organ distress and provide medication therapy 
and other interventions to monitor and prevent further neurological damage, 
while also setting important limits to their efforts. As for using ECMO as a bridge 
to VAD, the uncertainty of the current health status of the patient prompts a more 
“wait and see” approach. With that, the team also should realistically consider the 
higher rates of long-term disability and morbidity and mortality rates with T.K.’s 
co-morbidities and the surmounting financial burdens to the patient, family, and/
or healthcare institution. However, the team’s decision should not be isolated from 
a surrogate decision-maker. Thus, they need to first establish who is the surrogate 
decision-maker before moving forward in providing continued ECMO support in 
a “wait and see” approach.
T.K. is unmarried, does not have a significant other in his life, and his only 
family is a distant cousin who lives three states away and his estranged father. His 
father left T.K. and his mother, when he was 15 years old. Since the time, T.K.’s 
mother passed away from metastatic ovarian cancer, and he has been putting 
himself through college, while working a full-time job as an apprentice carpenter. 
T.K. talked to his father a few times on the phone over the past 2 years (his father 
calls every birthday); they met once for coffee about 2 months prior to T.K.’s hospi-
talization. T.K.’s father wanted to be back in his son’s life and has been at his bedside 
nearly every day since his hospitalization. Given this information, and the legal 
requirements for next of kin (i.e., parent), the team is comfortable with providing 
ongoing communication with the father and involving him in shared decision-
making regarding his son.
T.K.’s father does not insist that “everything be done” but approaches the situa-
tion based on what he feels his son would want. He describes his son as a “fighter,” 
who is resilient, physically and emotionally strong, and would not want to be in 
a position, where he would have no quality of life or possibility to “fight” for his 
independence. The father is hopeful for his son’s recovery, and willing to put in the 
work to secure him the resources he needs, however, he has also requested that if 
nothing more can be done, to simply “let him rest in peace” without “being a guinea 
pig” for scientific discovery. His reason for leaving his wife was due to her reliance 
on homeopathic medicine, and for never giving Western medicine a chance. T.K. 
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resented both of his parents for their actions but was willing to rekindle his relation-
ship with his father, as reported by his father.
4.2.3 Moral principles and theories
In considering the clinical narrative of T.K., his father’s narrative, and the 
healthcare team’s initial moral judgment, it would seem as though the initial deci-
sions to continue ECMO and treat the existing co-morbid issues, while engaging 
T.K.’s father in ongoing conversations about treatments and prognosis aligns with 
the principles of beneficence and nonmaleficence. T.K.’s father, in considering his 
son’s needs and interests first, recognizes the importance of quality of life, end of life 
decision-making that is in the best interests of the patient, and the difficult nature 
of this clinical situation, which could change at any moment. Both the healthcare 
team and T.K.’s father mutually supports the decision to continue ECMO, treat any 
underlying problems, monitor the neurological effects from the stroke, and deter-
mine next steps. If and when T.K. should continue to decline, and ECMO is no longer 
beneficial, the team has discussed further options with his father including removal 
of ECMO. Advance care planning is guided by a care ethics approach, which involves 
caring for T.K. and his father (e.g., bereavement counseling), as well as the promo-
tion of T.K.’s autonomy through surrogate decision-making, i.e., decisions based on 
what T.K. would have wanted if he were able to decide for himself.
4.2.4 A need to refine the coherence framework with new information
T.K. continues to decline, including an LV distention and subsequent pulmonary 
edema, and the neurological effects of the embolic stroke have proven to be severe. 
T.K.’s father, distraught with the new information, and knowing this is the end for 
his sons, asks the team to continue ECMO support for purposes of organ procure-
ment, as “my son was a giving person, and I believe he would want to be able to 
help others.” However, with multi-organ failure, a viral infection, prior ischemic 
stroke, and pulmonary edema, the team suspects there are no viable organs despite 
recent success cases [28], and thus, the best decision is to remove ECMO and allow 
T.K. to have dignity at the end of his life. The inconclusive nature of brain death 
determinations on ECMO, the high probability of non-viable organs that would 
be otherwise discarded rather than donated, the lack of robust case presentations 
and evidence-based medicine regarding ECMO patients as organ donors, and the 
rapid decline of T.K., all contributed to the background belief that ECMO should 
be withdrawn without pursuing organ procurement. This belief or rather the facts 
of the case, thus support the initial moral judgment to reduce or avoid unnecessary 
harm and keep T.K.’s father well-informed. However, the “wait and see” approach 
needs to be refined given the new clinical information (i.e., T.K.’s new prognosis), 
and the meaning of “harm” can be elucidated with a deeper examination of the 
ethical theories and principles as well as the status of the medical interventions (i.e., 
ECMO is no longer beneficial).
4.2.5 Revision, refinement, and reflection
In considering the new information, the healthcare team discusses removal 
of ECMO support and the inability to procure viable organs at this time, despite 
the honorable and altruistic recommendation by T.K.’s father. The team openly 
discusses the relatively new approaches to organ procurement from patients, who 
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are on ECMO, and some of the ethical and pragmatic concerns with the father. T.K.’s 
father understands what the team is relaying and is in agreement that more harm 
than good can arise from organ procurement; however, he does question whether 
removal of ECMO is necessary, given that T.K. is rapidly declining and has no hope 
for survival anyways. The team then explains that because ECMO is no longer ben-
eficial, if T.K. were to remain on this technology for any length of time, additional 
harms, i.e., damage to his body, are likely and the team does not want to contribute 
to those harms if they can prevent them. Of note, it is difficult for everyone who has 
cared about T.K. to see him continue without any benefit (moral distress). Even if 
a non-beneficial treatment policy were to be implemented by the healthcare team, 
which permits them to forgo treatment that is not a benefit to the patient when 
family or surrogates insist to continue treatment, having the honest and open con-
versation prior any discussion surrounding hospital policy is preferable. The team 
is able to share what they mean by “harm” and have an opportunity to understand 
the family or surrogate’s point of view. Here, T.K.’s father understands that medicine 
cannot bring back his son, and collectively decides to withdraw ECMO support with 
the healthcare team. However, ethical considerations should not end simply with 
this decision; the healthcare team should reflect on the father’s experiences: losing 
his wife who refused Western medicine and losing a son with the limitations of 
Western medicine. Further care such as grief counseling, support groups, or simply 
acknowledging this difficult time should be part of the WRE; all persons involved 
ought to be considered along with those decisions or recommendations that emerge 
from achieving coherence. That is, the WRE prompts us to see all issues or concerns 
of a case or situation that involve multiple persons (healthcare team, patients, and 
family/surrogate).
Part of the ethical framework also prompts the healthcare team, institutions, 
and others to think critically about future patients, policies, and guidelines that 
could open up the organ donor pool significantly while giving family and surro-
gates the opportunity to make such decisions. In the end, while T.K.’s father agrees 
to the withdraw of ECMO treatment, there is also the possibility of future family 
members or surrogates who insist on continuing ECMO support in the effort 
to hold onto hope. In such cases, the WRE can help guide healthcare teams and 
families to understand the limits of medical technology, the importance of decid-
ing what the patient would have wanted, the harms of continuing non-beneficial 
treatment, and the resources available for bereavement and support when letting 
go of a loved one.
The case of T.K. could had a very different outcome; instead of a rapid decline 
and no benefit of ECMO, to improvement with continued ECMO support, but not 
without future extensive rehabilitation, and a loss of quality of life (i.e., T.K. no 
longer able to work, go to school, or have the same capabilities as he did prior to 
hospitalization). Such decisions, though, should ultimately be left up to the family 
or surrogate decision-maker as to whether to continue ECMO or to withdraw given 
the prognosis of a potentially poor quality of life and a lifetime of ongoing care. 
Advance care planning, then, is essential for patients and families confronted with 
these ECMO decisions, as is the understanding of “harms” and “quality of life” as 
every outcome does not lead to a complete recovery without complications. Each 
patient and family member or surrogate will have different values and interpreta-
tions that ultimately ought to be respected by the healthcare team following shared 
decision-making and a careful consideration of the elements of the WRE, especially 
as new information requires us to revise, refine, and reflect on previously held 
judgments and actions.
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5. Concluding thoughts
Although our two patients, M.J. and T.K., do not have successful outcomes with 
ECMO, and are unable to utilize this technology as a bridge to recovery; this does 
not suggest ECMO for them is simply a “bridge to nowhere.” What ECMO became 
for them was a bridge for careful ethical considerations, meaningful family and sur-
rogate engagement and support, shared decision-making with the healthcare team, 
and outcomes that preserved the quality of life at the end of life. While ECMO had 
to be withdrawn, it was not done hastily, and pushes the healthcare community, 
including clinical ethicists, to critically think about best practices, policies, and 
ethical guidance, and the future of ECMO for such opportunities as organ donation.
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